

(SECRET) NOFORN

Su-84936-65

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BN	AI	AI	AI	AI	AI
DD	AI2	CJCS	CSA	CSA	CSA
SCI	ST	D/JS	CHO	CHO	CHO
AG	XX	CJCS	CSAF	CSAF	CSAF
PLG	CU	JRC	CUC	CUC	CUC

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DE YADNIN 10 28/1500Z  
O 281350Z ZYH  
FM BGEN MCCHRISTIAN J2 MACV  
TO LT GEN CARROLL DIA  
INFO BGEN BROWN J2 CINCPAC  
ZEM

SECRET NOFORN MAC 6016 INTEL FINAL SECTION OF THREE  
QUOTE:

WE KNOW THAT PAVN/VC HAVE EXTENSIVE STOCKPILES IN MANY BASF AND STORAGE AREAS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. (VUGRAPH NO. 7 ON) THIS VUGRAPH SHOWS MAJOR BASE AREAS AND THE GENERAL DRIFT OF INFILTRATION ROUTES. THE ENEMY HAS HAD SEVERAL YEARS IN WHICH TO STOCKPILE AND PREPARE THE BATTLEFIELD IN ACCORDANCE WITH ACCEPTED COMMUNIST THEORY. (VUGRAPH NO. 7 OFF) THE PAVN CAPACITY TO INCREASE THEIR CURRENT LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN THE RVN IS CONSIDERABLE. WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED AN LOC STUDY OF THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE (VUGRAPH NO. 8 ON). WE CONCLUDE THAT WITH A MAJOR TRUCK EFFORT THE DRV HAS THE CAPABILITY OF MOVING 300 TONS PER DAY FROM THE DRV THROUGH LAOS INTO THE RVN DURING THE DRY WEATHER. THIS 300 TON CAPABILITY NLLS OFF TO 50 TONS PER DAY BY VARIOUS TRANSPORT MEANS DURING THE NORMAL FIVE MONTH RAINY SEASON. THE AVERAGE YEAR ROUND DAILY CAPACITY FIGURES OUT TO BE 195 TONS PER DAY.

DRV LOGISTICAL CAPABILITY THROUGH CAMBODIA IS ALSO VERY SUBSTANTIAL. WE ARE UNABLE TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT THAT IS BEING INFILTRATED OR SMUGGLED INTO THE RVN. HOWEVER, WE CONSIDER 25 TONS PER DAY TO BE THE MINIMUM AMOUNT. BEST INFORMATION ON SEA INFILTRATION IS ABOUT 14 TONS PER DAY. WE CONSIDER BOTH THE SEA AND CAMBODIA OFFER A GREATER CAPABILITY BUT WE USE THE LOWER FIGURES FOR THE WANT OF MORE ACCURATE INFORMATION. ALTOGETHER PAVN'S CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT THEIR FORCES IN THE RVN TOTALS 234 TONS PER DAY. (VUGRAPH NO. 8 OFF)

WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL PAVN TROOPS AND IMPROVED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, THE LEVEL OF COMBAT WILL INCREASE AND THE ENEMY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS WILL INCREASE. WE ESTIMATE THAT REQUIRED POUNDS PER MAN PER DAY WILL REACH A LEVEL OF 8.2 POUNDS IN THE NEAR FUTURE FOR PAVN TROOPS AND 3.6 POUNDS FOR VIET CONG TROOPS. OUR ESTIMATE IS BASED ON A REDUCED VERSION OF A DIA STUDY (VUGRAPH NO. 9 ON). THE DIA STUDY GIVES 13.2 POUNDS FOR A PAVN SOLDIER IN LIGHT COMBAT IN THE RVN. WE HAVE REDUCED THAT AMOUNT IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER. ONE POUND FOR CLASS I BASED ON THE KNOWN PAVN/VC PLANNING FIGURE OF 2 POUNDS OF CLASS I PER MAN. WE ELIMINATE CLASS III FOR INFILTRATION AS WE HAVE ACCOUNTED FOR IT IN OUR LOC CAPACITIES. WE REDUCED THE AMOUNT OF CLASS V FROM 5.5 POUNDS TO 3.2 POUNDS. OUR REASON FOR THIS IS THAT WE CONSIDER THE LIGHT COMBAT RATE TO BE HIGH. WE CONSIDER A RATE OF 1/5 OF THE FORCE TO BE ENGAGED IN COMBAT EVERY SEVENTH DAY AND EXPENDING 1/3 OF THEIR BASIC LOAD TO BE MORE ACCURATE. (VUGRAPH NO. 9 OFF). NOW LET US COMPUTE OUR TONNAGE REQUIREMENTS. (VUGRAPH NO. 10 ON)

AS WE HAVE SEEN, TOTAL LOC CAPACITY IS 234 TONS PER DAY. UNDER LIGHT COMBAT CONDITIONS PRESENT ENEMY FORCES WILL REQUIRE ABOUT 84 TONS PER DAY FROM OUTSIDE THE RVN OR FROM STOCKPILES.

DIA and JCS review(s) completed.

WE COMPUTE THIS AS FOLLOWS: 27 PAVN BATTALIONS AT 1.86 TONS PER DAY EQUALS 50.22 TONS PER DAY. (CLASS 1 OF 2 POUNDS HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM PAVN AND VC TOTALS BECAUSE OF ITS AVAILABILITY WITHIN THE RVN) 83 VIET CONG BATTALIONS AT .4 TONS PER DAY EQUAL 33.20 TONS FOR A TOTAL OF 83.42 OR 84 TONS REQUIRED DAILY. WE HAVE AN EXCESS OF 150 TONS TO SUPPORT ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS. IF 150 IS DIVIDED BY 1.86 TONS WE FIND THAT 80 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS CAN BE SUPPORTED. WE USED THE FIGURE FOR THE PAVN BATTALION BECAUSE IT REQUIRED MORE LOGISICAL SUPPORT THAN THE VC BATTALION. THIS IS NOT INTENDED TO INDICATE THE 80 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS WILL ALL BE PAVN. CONSEQUENTLY, WITH A MAXIMUM DRV EFFORT EXISTING LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS CAN SUPPORT THE CURRENT 110 PAVN/VC BATTALIONS PLUS 80 ADDITIONAL BATTALIONS FOR A TOTAL OF 190 BATTALIONS. (VUGRAPH 10 OFF)

ENEMY STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE THEIR AIM OF A UNIFIED VIETNAM UNDER HANOI IS BASED UPON THE CONDUCT OF A LONG WAR DURING WHICH THEY WILL EXACT MAXIMUM ATTRITION ON ALLIED AND ESPECIALLY U.S. FORCES. THEY WILL AVOID COMBAT UNLESS THEY EXPECT VICTORY. THEY WILL ATTEMPT TO RETAIN A FORCE RATIO OF MANEUVER BATTALIONS IN THEIR FAVOR BY HOLDING ATTACKS AGAINST OUR BASES. DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS TO DISPERSE OUR FORCES AND SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS AT WIDESPREAD LOCATIONS. THEY WILL THREATEN AND ATTACK OUR BASE AREAS IN ORDER TO INNOBILIZE THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF SECURITY FORCES AND TO DESTROY AIRCRAFT, EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. THEY WILL MOUNT ATTACKS DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT THE COMMITMENT OF OUR GENERAL RESERVES. THEY WILL ATTACK ISOLATED FORCES IN ORDER TO INFLICT HEAVY LOSSES. THEY WILL CONTINUE ACTIONS TO ISOLATE AND DOMINATE THE HIGHLANDS IN ORDER TO SECURE THEIR BASE AREA AT THE TERMINUS OF THEIR LAOS INFILTRATION ROUTES. THEY WILL EXERT CONTINUOUS PRESSURE TO INTERDICT ROADS AND RAILROADS, TO TERRORIZE AREAS OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND TO WEAR DOWN OUR WILL TO RESIST. THEY WILL DEFEND THEIR MAJOR BASES BECAUSE THEIR PROTRACTED CONFLICT DEPENDS UPON THE STOCKPILING THEY HAVE BEEN DOING FOR YEARS.

ALTHOUGH THE ENEMY HAS GREAT CAPABILITIES HE ALSO HAS SIGNIFICANT VULNERABILITIES. HE MUST DEFEND HIS LOGISTIC BASE AREAS, AND HIS LONG LOGISTICAL LOC IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO INTERDICTION. HE IS ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE TO AIR AND ARTILLERY ATTACK, SUSTAINED COMBAT OPERATIONS AND AGGRESSIVE PURSUIT. ADDITIONALLY, HE IS DEPENDENT UPON THE SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL POPULATION.

IN SUMMARY, WE CONCLUDE THAT THE ENEMY HAS THE CAPABILITY TO INCREASE HIS STRENGTH TO 155 BATTALIONS BY THE END OF 1966. FROM THAT DATE ON HIS LOSSES SHOULD EXCEED HIS INPUT.

THIS CONCLUDES MY PORTION OF THE BRIEFING. I WILL BE FOLLOWED BY THE J3, GENERAL DEPUTY.

UNQUOTE

A COPY OF THE BRIEFING AND OZALID RED LINE PRINTS OF THE VIEWGRAPHS WILL BE GIVEN TO COL ELDER FOR DELIVERY TO COL GILLIS AT DIA, ISIC.


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## ORGANIZATION OF QUARTERMASTER SECTION (DIVISION)



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